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Revealed Preference With a
Subset of Goods
HAL R. VARIAN
Suppose that you observe n choices of k goods and prices when the con-sumer is actually choosing from a set of k +1 goods. Then revealed pref-
erence theory puts essentially no restrictions on the behavior of the data.
This is true even if you also observe the quantity demanded of good k +1,
or its price. The proofs of these statements are not difficult.
Suppose that we are given n observations on a consumer's choices of k
goods, (pi, xi), where p= and z are nonnegative k-dimensional vectors.
Under what conditions can we find a utility function u : Rk -+ R that
rationalizes these observations? That is, when can we find a utility
function that achieves its constrained maximum at the observed choices?
This is, of course, a classical question of consumer theory. It has been
addressed from two distinct viewpoints, the first known as integrability
theory and the second known as revealed preference theory. Integrability
theory is appropriate when one is given an entire demand function while
revealed preference theory is more suited when one is given a finite
set of demand observations, the case described above. In the revealed
preference case, it is well known that some variant of the Strong Axiom
of Revealed Preference (SARP) is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the data (pi, zx) to be consistent with utility maximization.
Now suppose that we are also given n observations on another chosen
good, (z;), i = 1,... , n where z; is a nonnegative scalar, but we do not
have a price series to accompany these observations. We now ask when
will there exist a utility function u: Rk+ -+ R that rationalizes the data
(pi,zi,zi) for i = 1,...,n? Equivalently, we can ask when we can find
a series of scalar prices (q;) such that the entire data set (p, qi, zi, zi) is
consistent with utility maximization?
This question is of considerable interest, since we typically can observe
only a subset of the goods chosen by a consumer. For example, we
would expect that the planned consumption of future goods would enter
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the utility function, and these are generally not observed. Similarly,
contingent consumption plans are also not observed.
The variables (zi) may also be interpreted as a "demographic" variable
such as household size or household location. Such variables are often
used in applied demand analysis to control for taste differences. Then
we are asking when we can find a family of utility functions, u(r, z),
parameterized by z, such that for each fixed z; the data (p; , xi) sat-
isfy the restrictions imposed by demand theory. I will return to this
interpretation below.
The first interpretation, that of a missing price, has been addressed by
Polemarchakis (1983) in the intertemporal context, using the machinery
of integrability theory. He shows that there are essentially no observ-
able restrictions on demand functions in this context. Here we examine
these issues using the methods of revealed preference theory and reach
a similar conclusion. However, if one is willing to place bounds on the
expenditure on the unobserved good, then we show that demand theory
does impose some restrictions on the observed behavior.
1. OBSERVED QUANTITIES, UNOBSERVED PRICES
Let us first describe the form of the revealed preference conditions that
we will use. If all prices and goods are observed, a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for these choices to be consistent with utility maxi-
mization is that the data satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP).
DEFINITION. An observation ri is directly revealed preferred to a
bundle x (written zxR0x) if pixi ;> piz. An observation is revealed
preferred to a bundle z (written xRz) if there is some sequence such
that xiR~x; ... XkR0 Z. A set of data (p;, z), i = 1,... n satisfies the
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if z;Rz; implies
pjzj < pjzi.
Further information on these concepts may be found in Varian (1982)
which in turn is based on earlier work by Afriat (1967) and Diewert
(1973). GARP is a generalization of the Strong Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence (SARP) that allows for different quantity vectors to be observed
for a single price vector. It is therefore appropriate for examining cases
where preferences may be weakly convex, rather than strictly convex
preferences as is required by SARP.
It is now easy to answer the question posed above. We simply ask
when we can construct a price series (qi) for i = 1,... n such that the
entire data set (pi, qi, x, z=) satisfies GARP. As it turns out this can be
done simply by choosing large enough values for qi so that the expendi-
ture on the z-good "swamps" the revealed preference comparison. The
details are given in the following theorem.
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THEOREM 1. Let (pi,,ai), i= 1,..., n be a set of data and let (z;) be
a set of n positive scalars. For each i, let Ei be subset of the data that
satisfies zj = zi for all t in Ei. Then the only restriction imposed by the
maximization hypothesis is that the data (ps, z ) satisfy GARP in each
subset Ei. In particular, if zi # zj for all i and j, so that E_ = {z},
then the maximization model imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the
observed choices.
Proof. First we show that the condition is necessary. This follows
easily from the fact that z,Raz, implies that (x,, z=)R 0 (zt, zi) whatever
the price qj. Thus a violation of GARP involving observations in E; will
necessarily create a violation of GARP with the additional good z;.
In order to prove sufficiency, we will construct a set of prices (q;) such
that the entire data set satisfies GARP. For each i choose qi such that
qi > max ,1(.-xi) (1)
joiE: Zi - zj
Within each subset E, we are assured that the data satisfy GARP. What
about across subsets? I claim that (xi, z)R 0 (xi, z5) if and only if zi > zj,
when z, and zj are in different subsets E; and Ej. There are two cases:
(1) zi > z3. Cross multiplying (1) we have:
p;(z, -.Ti) +g,(z, - zj) > 0
which means that (xz, z1)R(z, z,).
(2) z; < z3. Cross multiplying (1) again gives:
p;(x; -xj)+g(z- zj) <0
which means that it is not the case that (xe, z;)R°(xj, z,).
Given these choices for qi, is it possible that the set of data (p;, qi, xi, zi)
could violate GARP? We know that there are no violations within the
subsets Ei, so any violations must involve observations from different
subsets. But if (zi, zi) and (z1 , z) are in different subsets, we know that
(xi, zi)R(xj, zj) if and only if z; > z1 by construction. Thus a violation
of GARP would imply z, > zj and z; < zj, which is a contradiction. I
There are several remarks worth making about this theorem. First,
if z; were a vector, we could simply choose a vector q with zeros (or
small numbers) in every component but one. The above construction
would still work. Secondly, the numbers z; provide a complete preference
ordering for the subsets E;. Within each subset, the data are partially
ordered by the revealed preference order.
If the variables (zi) are thought of as demographic variables we can
use Afriat's theorem, as described in Varian (1982), to construct a piece-
wise linear utility function, u(z, z), that will rationalize the data in the
required sense. Thus, as long as we don't have any violations of revealed
preference for fixed values of the demographic variables, the maximiza-
tion hypothesis puts no restrictions on the behavior of the choice data.
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2. OBSERVED PRICES, UNOBSERVED QUANTITIES
The above theorem raises the question of what happens if we observe
prices for the omitted good but not quantities? In this case we get no
restrictions of any sort.
THEOREM 2. Let (pi,zi) i = 1,... n be a set of data and let (qi)
i = 1, ... , n be a set of positive prices. Then there always exists a set
of quantities (zi) i = 1, ... , n such that the data (pi, qi, xi, z;) satisfies
GARP.
Proof. Choose z1 = 0 and successively define
>m p+1;-p+zi+1 + +1ax, forti = 1, ... ., n - 1.
94+1)
Then for all i = 1,...,n - 1 we have:
pi+1Zi+1 + qi+1zi+ 1 > Pi+1zi; + qi+ 1z;
so that each observation i+ 1 is revealed preferred to observation i. Thus
the data must satisfy GARP.I
Note that the data can be reordered in any way desired so that any
preference ordering is consistent with the data. Furthermore, if neither
qi nor z; is observed there are clearly no restrictions whatsoever on the
data (p;,x;).
3. BOUNDING THE EXPENDITURE ON THE OMITTED GOOD
In the constructions given above we have essentially made the expendi-
ture on the omitted good so large that it has "swamped" the revealed
preference comparisons. If we are willing to bound the expenditure on
this good, we can get some restrictions on the subset of choices.
THEOREM 3. Let (pg,x;), i = 1,...,n be a set of data and (zi),
i = 1, ... ,n be an omitted good. Suppose that we postulate that the
maximum expenditure possible on the omitted good is bounded by (ei),
i = 1,... ,n. Then the data (p., z;, e,) are consistent with utility max-
imization if and only if there is a positive solution (U 1 ,hA,, di) to the
following set of linear inequalities:
U.5 U; +A\pj(xiz; )+ d;(z - z;)
dz 1 < A ej.
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Proof. Choose qi = di/A; and rewrite the inequalities in the following
form:
U < Uj + Ajpj(z, - x1)+ Afgj(z; - z1)
gjzj<e3 .
But these are simply the Afriat inequalities which have been shown to
be a necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization in Afriat
(1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982). I
In order for this result to be of interest, we have to show that the
inequality conditions given in Theorem 3 are not vacuous. A simple
example will suffice.
Suppose for example that we have two observations on three goods
with the following specifications: xi = (1,2), z2 = (2,1), pi = (1,2),
p2 = (2, 1), z1 = 1, and z2 = 2. It is easy to see that these observations
violate the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference. Suppose that we
try to patch things up by choosing prices (qi, q2 ) so that observation 2





Since that doesn't work, let's try to assure that observation 1 is not
revealed preferred to observation 2. In this case we have:
5+ qi 4+2q1
which implies that qi > 1. Thus the expenditure on zi must be at least
1 in order to satisfy the revealed preference restrictions. It follows that
if the bound on the expenditure on the omitted good is less than 1, the
data can not be consistent with GARP.
If (qj) is observed but (zi) is not observed, a similar set of inequalities
can be constructed, but they are now nonlinear. This is also the case if
total expenditure is observed, but neither q; nor zi is observed.
Theorem 3 suggests a way to check for "significant violations" of re-
vealed preference. Suppose that we have a set of data (pi, zi, z;) that
violates revealed preference. It would be convenient to have an "index"
of the degree of violation of revealed preference. One way to do this
would be to find the smallest value E such that the inequalities
U;i <U + Ajpj (xi - zy) + dj(z; - zj )
d, z, < A7i
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have a positive solution. The number a tells us how much the expendi-
ture would have to be on the z-good in order to satisfy the restrictions of
utility maximization. If the z-good is a demographic variable, a would
give us an index of how important it would have to be for it to account
for the taste differences necessary to describe the data. Since the in-
equalities described in Theorem 3 are linear in the unknown variables,
checking for feasibility does not pose undue computational difficulties.
4. CONCLUSION
If the utility function is assumed to have some special structure such
as separability-where u(x, z) has the form U(v(z), z)-it is well known
that maximization does impose restrictions on the data (p2, xi). These
restrictions are summarized in Varian (1983). However, without this
assumption of special structure, there are essentially no restrictions im-
posed by the maximization model on a subset of the choice data.
I take this to be a negative result, similar in spirit to the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu results described in Shaefer and Sonnenschein (1983),
although obviously not as deep. The sad fact of the matter is that the
restrictions imposed by the optimization hypothesis only apply when we
have observed the entire choice set. Hence the normal sorts of tests for
consistency of observed choice must be interpreted instead as tests for
separability of the observed choices from other variables in the utility
function rather than test of maximization per se.
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ESTIMATING RISK AVERSION FROM
ARROW-DEBREU PORTFOLIO CHOICE
BY HAL R. VARIAN'
This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for Arrow-Debreu
choices of contingent consumption to be compatible with the maximization
of a state independent expected utility function that exhibits increasing or
decreasing absolute risk aversion, or increasing or decreasing relative risk
aversion. The conditions can be used to bound different measures of risk
aversion based on a single observation of Arrow-Debreu portfolio choice.
THE EXPECTED UTILITY hypothesis forms the basis for much of our under-
standing of investor behavior under uncertainty. It is commonly agreed that
a well-behaved expected utility function should be an increasing and concave
function of wealth, or, equivalently, that its first derivative should be positive
and its second derivative should be negative. It is also widely accepted that the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion should be declining with wealth.
There is much less agreement about the behavior of the Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative risk aversion, although some investigators have argued that it should
increase with wealth.
In this note I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for choices of contin-
gent consumption across states of nature to satisfy various hypotheses about
the behavior of these measures of risk aversion. If the portfolio choice behavior
of the consumer is consistent with the conditions I derive, then the conditions
can be used to bound the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk
aversion. The conditions are derived using methods of the "nonparametric ap-
proach" to optimizing behavior introduced by Afriat (1967) and extended by
Diewert (1973), Diewert and Parkan (1978), and Varian (1982), (1983a). Appli-
cations of these methods to choice under uncertainty include Dybvig and Ross
(1982), Green and Srivastava (1983), and Varian (1983b).
1. THE MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
Consider an investor who chooses a pattern of consumption across states of
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S S
(1) s.t. qac, = q,,
,=1 a=1
Here Ir, is the probability that state s will occur, c, is the endowment of consump-
tion in state s, and q, is the price for an Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity
that pays off one unit of consumption if state s occurs. We will suppose that
u(c) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable function.
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
TSu'(c,) = Aq, s = 1,..., S
We can always choose an affine transformation of the expected utility function
so that A = 1. Thus, we can define p, = q,/7r, and rewrite the first order
conditions as:
u'(c,)=p, s= 1,...,S
The ratios of state prices to probabilities are assumed to be observable, so that
the numbers (p,, c,) for s = 1,... , S represent the potentially observable con-
sumption data associated with the choice problem we are studying.
We will say we can rationalize this choice behavior if we can find a once
differentiable increasing concave function v(c) that satisfies the appropriate first-
order conditions. Since the first-order conditions are sufficient conditions for the
maximization of a concave function, this will guarantee that (c,) actually solves
the given maximization problem.
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), Dybvig and Ross (1982) and Green and
Srivastava (1983) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a utility
function to exist that rationalizes some choices (p,, c,) is that c, is a decreasing
function of pa. If we number the states of nature so that ci < c2 < ... < cs we
can express this condition as simply requiring that P1 > P2 > ... > ps. From
now on we will assume that the states have been numbered in this way and that
the observed consumption values satisfy this condition. The question that we
pose is: what further conditions must be satisfied if the observed choices are to
be compatible with various hypotheses about the behavior of risk aversion?
2. ABSOLUTE RISK AVERSION
Let r(c) = -u"(c)/u'(c) be the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
We observe that decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion is equivalent to
the requirement that log u'(c) is a convex (concave) function. This follows since
dlogu'(c) u"(c)
dc u'(c) = -r(c).
Differentiating both sides of this identity, and using the assumption that r' (c) <
0, we have
d2 log u'(c) ,
dc2 = -r'(c) > 0.
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Since log u'(c) is a convex function, it must satisfy the following inequalities:
(2) log u'(c,+i) log u'(c,)+ dlogu'( [c,+-C]
(3) log u'(c,..1) > logu'(c,) + d log u'(c,)[c,-i - c,]dc
Substituting p, = u'(c,), r(c,) = -d log u'(c,)/dc, and recalling that c,...1 <
c, < c,+ 1, we can rearrange these inequalities to give us the following Ratio
Condition:
(4) log'+ - logp,+ 1 <r(c) < logp,..' 1 - log ,
C,+1 - CC, - C..1
The Ratio Condition gives us an observable bound on risk aversion at each
choice of contingent consumption. It has a simple geometric interpretation given
in Figure 1. Here we have plotted log p, versus c, and connected the dots. (The
other constructions in Figure 1 will be explained below.) It follows easily from
risk aversion that the resulting piecewise linear function must be downward slop-
ing. The Ratio Condition implies that the slopes of the line segments connecting
each dot must be becoming flatter as consumption increases. That is, the piece-
wise linear function in Figure 1 depicted by the bold line must be a convex
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FIGURE 1.-Geometric interpretation of the Ratio Condition.
Thus the Ratio Condition gives us a necessary condition for decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion. However, it turns out that the condition is sufficient as well.
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That is, if the inequalities defined by the Ratio Condition are satisfied, then
it will always be possible to construct an increasing, concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function v(c) that exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion
and which generates the choices (c,) as optimizing choices.
In order to prove this, let us suppose that the inequalities given in the Ratio
Condition can be satisfied so that we can choose a set of numbers (r,) that
satisfies the inequalities
(5) logP - log p'+1< <<log p,-1 - log p,
c,+ 1 - c, ~ ca- c,-1
Geometrically, this simply means that we can choose a set of slopes (r,) that
lie between the slopes given by piecewise linear function depicted in Figure 1 at
each observation.
Now define the function given by the lower envelope of these lines:
log p(x) = min {logp, - r,(x - c,)}.
Since we have assumed that c,.1 < c, < c,+1 this function will be differentiable
at x = c, for s = 1, ... , S, and its derivative will be given by
dlog p(c,) =_p'(c,)
dc p(c.) ''
Now define the function
v(c) = p( ) d= CeXp[logp(x)]dz.
This is simply a monotonic transformation of the area under log p(x), as depicted
in Figure 1. We now observe the following:
1. The first derivative of v(c) at c, is p,.
2. The second derivative of v(c) at c, is given by
v"(c,) = p'(c,) = -r,p, <0.
Thus v(c) is a concave function. It follows that the satisfaction of the first-order
conditions is a sufficient condition for the observed choices to actually solve
the maximization problem given in (1). That is, the function v(c) rationalizes
the choices (p,, c,).
3. The absolute risk aversion of v(c) at c, is given by
v"(c,)=rar(c,) =- ="(r,
v'(c,) 'r,
and the numbers (r,) form a decreasing sequence by construction.
This completes the argument. It follows that the Ratio Conditions are a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the observed Arrow-Debreu portfolio choices to
satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Of course, the entire argument works
mutalis mutandis for the case of increasing absolute risk aversion.
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3. RELATIVE RISK AVERSION
Let us turn now to the case of relative risk aversion, given by
p( c)= u"(c)c
u'(c)
Essentially the same kind argument works, but there are a few twists, so it is
worthwhile spelling out the details.
We first observe that the chain rule gives us
d log u'(c) _ dlog u'(c) dlog c
dc dlogc dc
Taking the derivatives,
u"(c) _ dlog u'(c) 1
u'(c) dlog c c
It follows that
dlog u'(c)
(6) p(c) - dlogc
Applying the chain rule once more to (6), we have
d2 log u'(c) dlog c
d(log c)2  dc
It follows that increasing (decreasing) relative risk aversion is equivalent to
log u'(c) being a concave (convex) function of log c. We will treat the case of
increasing relative risk aversion, but the other case simply involves switching
around the inequalities.
Concavity implies the following inequalities
(7) +dlog u'(c,)
(7) logu'(c,+1) < log u'(c,) dlogc [log c,+i - log c,]
dlog c
logu'(.)-i-dlog u'(c,)
(8) < lo'(c,() l )+ dlog c [log c..i - log c,]
Manipulation and substitution along the lines of that performed above yields
log p* < - log p ) log p. - log
)logC, - log C,_- -c) <log c,+1 - logc,
We will refer to this as the Relative Ratio Condition.
The Relative Ratio Condition has the same geometric interpretation as before
if we plot logp, against log c,. And, as before, it is also a sufficient condition:
given an increasing series of numbers (p,) that satisfy the relative ratio condition,
it is possible to construct a utility function that will generated the observed
choices. The construction is given by
v(c) = p() dz.
where log p(x) = min{log p, - r,(log x - log C,)}.
The demonstration that this construction actually works is left as an exercise for
the reader.
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4. A CONTINUOUS STATE SPACE
The conditions given above easily generalize to an economy with a continuum of
possible consumption values. Let p(c) be the Arrow-Debreu price for contingent
consumption c. From the first-order conditions for maximization, we know that:
log p(c) = log u'(c)




It follows that decreasing absolute risk aversion, for example, implies that
log p(c) is a convex function. Similar conditions can be stated for increasing
absolute risk aversion, increasing or-decreasing relative risk aversion, and so on.
Equation (10) shows that the derivative of log p(c) gives absolute risk aversion
directly, so the bounds given earlier are irrelevant in the case of a continuum of
consumption values. Indeed, the ratios given on the left and right-hand sides of
(4) are simply the definitions of the left and right derivatives of logp(c) as c,_1
and cs+1 approach c,.
5. AGGREGATION ACROSS INDIVIDUALS
Up until now the analysis has only applied to a single consumer. However,
the conditions easily generalize to aggregate consumption, since curvature is
preserved under addition. Suppose, for example, that we have n consumers,
each of whom has a concave utility function that exhibits decreasing absolute
risk aversion.
Using a superscript to denote consumer i, the lower bound in equation (4)
implies that
1
r(c;) [log ps - logps+1] <; c' 1 - c'.
Summing over all consumers i = 1, ... , n, letting C, denote aggregate consump-
tion in state s, and rearranging we have
log p, - log ps + 1 < )-1
Cs+1 - Ca-r: (cs)s=1ri c))
The gives us a lower bound on a particular average of absolute risk aversion, and
an upper bound can be derived in a similar manner. It follows by inspection
that if every consumer has decreasing absolute risk aversion then the graph of
log p, against C, will have to have the same general shape as that depicted in
Figure 1; that is, it must be a decreasing, convex function.
ESTIMATING RISK AVERSION 7
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On the Goodness-of-Fit of Revealed Preference Conditions
Hal R. Varian
There are two approaches to the analysis of consumer choice behavior. Parametric analysis
proceeds by postulating a functional form for a utility function, deriving the associated
demand equations, and estimating the parameters of the resulting system of equations. The
resulting estimates can be used to test the maximization hypothesis, forecast demand, or
do welfare analysis. Nonparametric analysis uses revealed preference techniques to achieve
the same ends.
Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) were the first to develop the implications of
the revealed preference idea for economic theory, but Afriat (1967) was the first to pursue
its implications for empirical demand analysis. Subsequently Diewert (1973), Diewert
and Parkan (1978), and Varian (1982a), (1982b) extended Afriat's analysis in a number
of directions. More recently, several authors such as Browning (1984), Bronars (1985),
Deaton (19??) Green and Srivastava (1985), (1986), Houtman and Maks (1985), Landsburg
(1981), Manser and McDonald (1986), and Swofford and Whitney (1986) have contributed
to nonparametric analysis.
The aspect of nonparametric analysis that I wish to examine in this note has to do
with the goodness-of-fit of the utility maximization model-what does it mean to say that
some consumer behavior is "almost" consistent with maximization? The particular answer
I give to this question has some novel implications for parametric demand analysis as well.
1. Goodness of Fit
Consider the violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference depicted in Figure 1.
Here we have xt revealed preferred to x' and x- revealed preferred to x*. However, the size
of the violation is not large: a small perturbation of the budget line through either obser-
vation would eliminate the problem. Hence we might want to consider this an insignificant
violation of the maximization model.
The notion of what is or is not significant implicitly relies on a statistical model of how
the data were generated and what are the possible sources of error. In Varian (1985) I
examined how one might formalize the concept of significant violations in the context of
measurement error. Here I want to examine a different approach to the idea of "almost
maximizing" behavior that was first described by Afriat (1967). For the time being, I
will describe the goodness-of-fit measure without referring to a statistical model of error
generation, but that is clearly the next step on the research agenda.
Suppose that we have some demand data (pt, xt) where pt is a vector of prices and xt
a vector of quantities for t = 1,..., T. For a given set of numbers (e*), t = 1,... ,T, with
0 < et <1, define an extension of the standard direct revealed preference relation by
xt RS x' if and only if etpixt ;> ptX'.
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation.
1
x
I i '",\ xl
Figure 1. A violation of the Weak Axiom. However, a small perturbation of the budget
line through x' would remove the violation.
If et = 1 this is the standard revealed preference relation; if et = 0 the relation is vacuous
in the sense that observation t can not be revealed preferred to any other observation. As
et varies from 1 to 0 the number of observations revealed preferred to other observations
monotonically decreases.
The number et can be thought of as how much less the potential expenditure on a
bundle x' has to be before we will to consider it worse than the observed choice xt . If et
is .9, for example, we will only count bundles whose cost is less than 90% of an observed
choice xt as being revealed worse than x*. Said another way: if et is .9 and x' would cost
only 5% less than x t , we would not consider this a significant enough different to conclude
that xt was preferred by the consumer to x'. We are allowing the consumer a "margin of
error" of (1 - et).
Given an arbitrary set of data (pt, xt), let us choose a set of efficiency indices (et) that
are as close as possible to 1 in some norm. If the data satisfy the revealed preference
conditions exactly, then we can choose et = 1 for all t = 1,..., T. If we choose et = 0 for
all t = 1,... ,T, then the data vacuously satisfy the revealed preference conditions, since
no observation is revealed preferred to any other. Thus for any reasonable norm, there
will be some set of (et ) that is as close as possible to 1 that will summarize "how close"
the observed choices are to maximizing choices.
In Afriat's (1967) original treatment of this idea, he considered choosing a single e that
applied to all observations, rather than a different et for each observation. We refer to
this as a single index model as opposed to the multiple index model described above. The
advantage of Afriat's proposal is that it is much easier to compute a single index e than
the multiple indices (e').
Houtman and Maks (1985) suggest the following binary search. Start with e = 1 and
test for violations of revealed preference using Warshall's algorithm as described in Varian
(1982a). If the data fail to satisfy the strong axiom, try e = 1/2. If e = 1/2 doesn't work,
try e = 1/4. If e = 1/2 does work, try e = 3/4, and so on. After n revealed preference
tests, you are within 1/2" of the actual efficiency index.
Computing the set of efficiency indices that are as close as possible to 1 in some norm
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is substantially more difficult. If we choose a quadratic norm, for example, we would have
so solve a problem such as:
T
E = minZ(et -1)2 (1)
(et=1
subject to the constraint that the revealed preference relation Re satisfies the Strong
Axiom. This approach is significantly more demanding from a computational perspective.
2. A Characterization of the Efficiency Indices
There is a characterization of the set of (et) that minimize some norm that will be useful
in what follows. In order to describe it, we need some formal definitions.
As above, define the relation Re by x* Re x if et pt xt p'x, and let Re be the transitive
closure of this relation. Then define GARPe to mean
x* Re x* implies etptxt < ptx'.
If e' = 1 for all t then this reduces to the standard definition of GARP.
Here is another way to state this definition: if some data (pt, xt, et) satisfy GARPe,
then
for all x' Re xt we have etptxt < ptx'.
This statement can be transformed to
et < pXBfor all x' Re x*.ptxte
If we attempt to choose a set of (et) that are on the average as close as possible to 1, then
it must be that
et = min . (2)
z'ReXt ptxt
Note that this is not really an "operational" way to determine et, since et is implicitly
involved in the relation Re. Nevertheless, the characterization is still useful, as we will see
below.
3. Parametric Methods
The characterization of (et) described in the last section is useful because it can be extended
easily to a novel way to estimate parametric demand systems. Suppose that one is willing
to postulate that some observed demand behavior was generated by the maximization of
a particular parametric utility function u(x,#/), where #3 is a vector of parameters.
Let >- be the preferences generated by the utility function u(x,#/). Then it is natural




All we have done is to replace the partial order Re by the total order >-.
Using some constructs from duality theory allows for an easier statement of this defi-
nition. The money metric utility function m(p, x) is defined to be
m(p, x) =min py
V
s.t. y - .
In words, the money metric utility function measures the minimum expenditure at prices
p the consumer would need to be as well off as he would be consuming the bundle x. For
more on the money metric utility function see Samuelson (1974), King (1982), and Varian
(1984). If utility is parameterized by /3, then the money metric utility function depends
on the same parameters and we write m(p, x,/3).
In terms of the money metric utility function, we can restate the definition of the
efficiency index as
.t- m(pt, xt,)
In words, m(pt, xt, /3) gives the minimum expenditure necessary to achieve utility u(xt)
while ptxt gives the expenditure actually observed. Therefore, the consumer is "wasting"
a fraction 1 - it of his money.
An index of the degree of violation of maximization in the data set could be given by
m(pf(it ,,) 2
I = t - 1 .
t=1 ( p
This definition is directly analogous to equation (1).
The discussion to this point has proceeded under the assumption that /3 was known.
But what if /3 is unknown? Then we would like to have an estimate of /3-an estimate that
provides the best fit to the maximizing model. A natural estimate is to find that value of /
that minimizes the degree of violation of maximizing behavior as measured by the index I.
This makes the average value of et as close as possible to 1, using the sum-of-squared-error
norm. I believe that this estimator has several desirable characteristics.
First, it uses a sensible economic norm for goodness-of-fit. Conventional estimators of
demand parameters use the sum-of-squared errors of the observed and predicted quantities
demand, or some variant on this. But this has little economic content; a large difference
between predicted and observed demand can easily be consistent with a small difference
in utility. This is depicted in Figure 2. Here the observed choice is far from the predicted
choice in Euclidean distance, but quite close in terms of money metric utility. The model
is a bad fit in terms of Euclidean distance, but a good fit in the sense that the consumer
really isn't that far from maximizing behavior in terms of money metric utility.
Second, the minimized value of the objective function gives a meaningful economic
measure of how close the observed choices are to maximizing choice for the particular
parametric form involved. If the average value of et is .95 for example, then it is meaningful






Figure 2. This is a good fit in terms of money metric utility although it is a bad fit in
terms of demand behavior.
Third, the mechanics of the estimation problem are much simpler than they are using
the conventional approach. Economic theory imposes the restriction that a money met-
ric utility function must be an increasing, linearly homogeneous, and concave function of
prices. These constraints are not terrible difficult to impose on the maximization problem.
By contrast theory implies that a system of demand equations must have a symmetric neg-
ative semidefinite Slutsky substitution matrix. Imposing this restriction involves imposing
nonlinear cross equation restrictions on a system of equations. In general this is a difficult
thing to do.
In summary: the Afriat efficiency index offers not only a sensible and easily computable
measure of the degree of violation of maximizing behavior in a nonparametric revealed
preference context, but it also suggests a novel way to estimate unknown parameters in
the parametric approach to demand estimation.
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